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BASIC STRUCTURE DOCTRINE AND 
ITS APPLICATION IN MALAYSIA: WITH 
REFERENCE TO DECIDED CASES1
23.1 INTRODUCTION
The separation of power doctrine propounded by the English 
philosopher, John Locke and the French writer, Baron de Montesquieu, 
provides that the legislative, executive and judicial functions of the 
Government should be discharged by independent institutions which 
is primarily aimed at avoiding the over-concentration of power in the 
hands of a few besides promoting transparency and accountability 
of the Government.2 The judiciary is not only entrusted to interpret 
and enforce the laws enacted by the Legislature3 but also to ensure 
IntroductionCHAPTER 23
1 This Chapter is contributed by Ashgar Ali Ali Mohamed. The contents of  this 
chapter has been published as an article in Malaysian Court Practice Bulletin 
No. 1 of  2020 and is reproduced in this book with kind permission of  LexisNexis 
(M) Sdn Bhd.
2 See PP v. Kok Wah Kuan [2007] 6 CLJ 341. In Alma Nudo Atenza v. PP & Another 
Appeal [2019] 5 CLJ 780 Richard Malanjum CJ stated: ‘The separation of  powers 
between the Legislature, the Executive, and the Judiciary is a hallmark of  a 
modern democratic State ... . [T]he separation of  powers is not just a matter of  
administrative efficiency. At its core is the need for a check and balance mechanism 
to avoid the risk of  abuse when power is concentrated in the same hands ... ’.
3 In PCP Construction Sdn Bhd v. Leap Modulation Sdn Bhd; Asian International Arbitration 
Centre (Intervener) [2019] 6 CLJ 1, Ramly Ali, Azahar Mohamed, Rohana Yusuf, 
Tengku Maimun Tuan Mat, Nallini Pathmanathan FCJJ delivering the judgment 
of  the Federal Court stated: ‘The courts of  justice are the bulwark of  a nation. 
Alexander Hamilton famously recognised, in the doctrine of  the separation of  
powers, that the Legislature controls money, the executive controls force and the 
judiciary controls nothing. It is on public confidence that the judiciary depends, 
for the general acceptance of  its judicial decisions, by both citizens and the 
Government. The public conforms to the decisions of  the judiciary, because they 
respect the concept of  judicial power and the judges who exercise such power. 
Therefore, the trust and confidence of  the people in the judicial system to deliver 
impartial justice comprises the very foundation of  the judiciary’.
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there is no encroachment or overstepping of power by the Legislature 
and the executive.4 The Judiciary is empowered to determine the 
constitutionality or legality of the executive decisions. Further, the 
constitutional amendments and legislation is also subject to judicial 
scrutiny and the courts are empowered to strike it down when it can 
be shown that the legislative action in enacting the legislation or the 
constitutional amendment was arbitrary and violated the constitutional 
framework.5 
In delivering a keynote address at the Lawasia Constitutional and Rule 
of Law Conference 2019, Tan Sri Dato’ Seri Utama Tengku Maimun bt 
Tuan Mat, Chief Justice of Malaysia stated: ‘The key idea behind the 
doctrine of separation of powers is the aim to prevent absolutism or the 
concentration of powers in one arm. Now, because the executive and the 
legislative branches are to some extent fused, and that they determine 
governmental policy backed by electoral mandate, it becomes the 
function of the Judiciary to ensure that such powers are exercised in full 
conformity with the law. This is why an attempt to undermine the strict 
separation of powers is viewed as an affront to democracy specifically, 
and to constitutionalism generally.’6 
4 In Country Garden Danga Bay Sdn Bhd v. Tribunal Tuntutan Pembeli Rumah & Anor 
[2019] 1 LNS 1693 Harmindar Singh Dhaliwal JCA stated: ‘[C]ases concerning 
judicial review and certiorari should be considered on a different footing as it is an 
important process to review executive and legislative actions. It provides the checks 
and balances which are imperative in the separation of  powers.’ 
5 In Alma Nudo Atenza v. PP & Another Appeal [2019] 5 CLJ 780 Richard Malanjum 
CJ, delivering the judgment of  the court, stated: ‘Whether an enacted law is 
constitutionally valid is always for the courts to adjudicate and not for Parliament 
to decide.’ 
6 Keynote address by Tan Sri Dato’ Seri Utama Tengku Maimun bt Tuan Mat 
entitled: ‘The Importance of  Constitutionalism in Public Institutions’ delivered at 
the Lawasia Constitutional & Rule of  Law Conference 2019 held at One World 
Hotel on 5 October 2019. The full speech is available at [2019] 6 MLJ i.
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Having said the above, this chapter discusses the application of the 
basic structure doctrine and with reference to decided cases. It is 
noteworthy that this doctrine was developed by the Indian Supreme 
Court in their landmark case of Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala7 
– a case heard and decided by a bench of 13 judges – which held inter 
alia, that the Constitution (Twenty-fourth Amendment) Act 1971 was 
unconstitutional and therefore void. The case of Kesavananda Bharati 
was subsequently followed in Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain,8 and 
Minerva Mills v. Union of India,9 among others. The doctrine dictates 
that the Constitution has certain ‘basic features’ which are permanent 
which cannot be altered or destroyed through legislative amendments. 
The ‘basic features’ of the Constitution are not defined and it is therefore 
left for the courts to determine. In the context of the Malaysian 
Constitution, it would necessarily include inter alia, the position of 
Islam as the religion of the federation, supremacy of the Constitution, 
fundamental liberties, constitutional monarchy, federalism and 
separation of the powers of the three branches of Government.10 
What is emphasised is that the judiciary is empowered to strike 
down an amendment to the Constitution or any enacted laws which 
conflicts with or seeks to alter the basic structure of the Constitution. 
As succinctly stated by Richard Malanjum CJ in Alma Nudo Atenza 
v. PP & Another Appeal:11 ‘Courts can prevent Parliament from 
7 [1973] AIR 1461, SC.
8 [1975] AIR 2299, SC.
9 [1980] AIR 1789, SC.
10 See Phang Chin Hock v. Public Prosecutor [1979] 1 LNS 67, FC. In KCSB Konsortium Sdn 
Bhd v. Pentadbir Tanah Johor Bahru & Anor And Another Case [2019] 1 LNS 1116, it 
was stated that ‘A person’s right to property is a fundamental right imbedded in the 
Federal Constitution by the founding fathers of  this nation. No law or institution 
can remove such right. Such right is part of  our basic structure of  the Federal 
Constitution.’
11 See footnote 5 above. 
Introduction
 
FOR ACADEMIC 
REPOSITORY 
PURPOSES 
ONLY
714
Basic Structure Doctrine And Its Application 
In Malaysia: With Reference To Decided Cases
destroying the “basic structure” of the Federal Constitution [FC]... 
And while the FC does not specifically explicate the doctrine of basic 
structure, what the doctrine signifies is that a parliamentary enactment 
is open to scrutiny not only for clear-cut violation of the FC but also for 
violation of the doctrines or principles that constitute the constitutional 
foundation. The role of the Judiciary is intrinsic to this constitutional 
order. Whether an enacted law is constitutionally valid is always for the 
courts to adjudicate and not for Parliament to decide.’ 
23.2 BASIC STRUCTURE DOCTRINE IN MALAYSIA
Initially, the doctrine of basic structure was not approved by the 
Malaysian courts, mainly because of some glaring differences between 
the Malaysian and Indian Constitution. In Phang Chin Hock v. Public 
Prosecutor,12 the Federal Court stated, “considering the differences in 
the making of the Indian and our Constitutions, in our judgment, it 
cannot be said that our Parliament’s power to amend our Constitution 
is limited in the same way as the Indian Parliament’s power to amend 
the Indian Constitution.” In rejecting the application of this doctrine, 
Raja Azlan Shah FJ (as His Majesty then was) in Loh Kooi Choon 
v. Government of Malaysia,13 stated ‘the question whether the impugned 
Act is ‘harsh and unjust’ is a question of policy to be debated and decided 
by Parliament, and therefore, not meet for judicial determination. To 
sustain it would cut very deeply into the very being of Parliament.’ In 
Loh Kooi Choon, the plaintiff claimed damages against the defendant for 
wrongful imprisonment which arose pursuant to his detention under 
Restricted Residence Enactment in violation of art. 5(4) of the Federal 
Constitution which required him to be produced before a magistrate 
within 24 hours of his arrest. His Lordship further added: 
‘It is therefore plain that the framers of our Constitution prudently 
realised that future context of things and experience would need a 
change in the Constitution, and they, accordingly, armed Parliament 
12 [1979] 1 LNS 67, FC.
13 [1975] 1 LNS 90.
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with “power of formal amendment”. They must be taken to have 
intended that, while the Constitution must be as solid and permanent as 
we can make it, there is no permanence in it. There should be a certain 
amount of flexibility so as to allow the country’s growth. In any event, 
they must be taken to have intended that it can be adapted to changing 
conditions, and that the power of amendment is an essential means of 
adaptation. A Constitution has to work not only in the environment in 
which it was drafted but also centuries later.’ 
The views of Raja Azlan Shah in Loh Kooi Choon were affirmed by Suffian 
LP in Phang Chin Hock v. Public Prosecutor,14 when his Lordship stated: 
‘[F]irst, Parliament have power to make constitutional amendments 
that are inconsistent with the Constitution. Secondly, Parliament may 
amend the Constitution in any way they think fit, provided they comply 
with all the conditions precedent and subsequent regarding manner and 
form prescribed by the Constitution itself and it is unnecessary for us 
to say whether or not Parliament’s power of constitutional amendment 
extends to destroying the basic structure of the Constitution. Thirdly, 
Act 216 is constitutional. Whatever may be the features of the basic 
structure of the Constitution, none of the constitutional amendments 
complained of and none of the impugned provisions of Act 216 have 
destroyed the basic structure of the Constitution.’15 Again, in Mark 
Koding v. PP,16 the Federal Court stated: “As regards to the argument 
that the amendments complained of affected the basic structure of the 
Constitution and are therefore unconstitutional, with great respect to 
Mr Heald, we have no difficulty in holding that they do not; and it was 
therefore unnecessary for us to consider the question whether or not 
Parliament has power to so amend the Constitution as to alter its basic 
structure whatever that may be.”
14 [1979] 1 LNS 67.
15 Act 216 refers to the Emergency (Essential Powers) Act 1979 which Act had ceased 
to have effect since 21 June 2012 by virtue of  cl. (7) of  art. 150 of  the Federal 
Constitution.
16 [1982] 2 MLJ 120 (FC).
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In Public Prosecutor v. Kok Wah Kuan,17 the majority Federal Court 
judges rejected the application of the basic structure doctrine in regards 
to the encroachment into judicial power by s. 97(2) of the Child Act 
2001. Earlier, the Court of Appeal held, inter alia, that the above section 
clearly contravened the doctrine of separation of powers housed in 
the Constitution by consigning to the executive the judicial power to 
determine the measure of the sentence. In allowing the appeal, setting 
aside the order of the Court of Appeal and reinstating the order of the 
High Court, Abdul Hamid Mohamad PCA, delivering a 4-1 majority 
judgment of the Federal Court,18 stated:
‘Our Constitution does have the features of the separation of powers 
and at the same time, it contains features which do not strictly comply 
with the doctrine. To what extent the doctrine applies depends on the 
provisions of the Constitution. A provision of the Constitution cannot 
be struck out on the ground that it contravenes the doctrine. Similarly, 
no provision of the law may be struck out as unconstitutional if it is not 
inconsistent with the Constitution, even though it may be inconsistent 
with the doctrine. The doctrine is not a provision of the Malaysian 
Constitution even though no doubt, it had influenced the framers of 
the Malaysian Constitution, just like democracy. The Constitution 
provides for elections, which is a democratic process. That does not 
make democracy a provision of the Constitution in that where any law 
is undemocratic it is inconsistent with the Constitution and therefore 
void.’
However, the dissenting judgment by Richard Malanjum FCJ held, inter 
alia, that the doctrines of separation of powers and the independence 
of the judiciary are basic features of our Constitution and that the 
jurisdiction and powers of the courts cannot be confined to federal law. 
In particular, his Lordship stated: 
“At any rate I am unable to accede to the proposition that with the 
amendment of art. 121(1) of the Federal Constitution (the amendment) 
the courts in Malaysia can only function in accordance with what have 
17 [2007] 6 CLJ 341.
18 Majority decision comprising of  Ahmad Fairuz CJ, Abdul Hamid Mohamad PCA, 
Alauddin Mohd Sheriff  CJ (Malaya) and Zaki Tun Azmi FCJ. The dissenting 
judgment was by Richard Malanjum CJ (Sabah & Sarawak).
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been assigned to them by federal laws. Accepting such proposition is 
contrary to the democratic system of the Government wherein the 
courts form the third branch of the Government and they function 
to ensure that there is ‘check and balance’ in the system including the 
crucial duty to dispense justice according to the law for those who 
come before them.
The amendment which states that ‘the High Courts and inferior courts 
shall have such jurisdiction and powers as may be conferred by or under 
federal law’ should by no means be read to mean that the doctrines of 
separation of powers and independence of the Judiciary are now no 
more basic features of our Federal Constitution. I do not think that as a 
result of the amendment our courts have now become servile agents of 
a federal act of Parliament and that the courts are now only to perform 
mechanically any command or bidding of a federal law.”
The recent decisions of the Federal Court in Sivarasa Rasiah v. Badan 
Peguam Malaysia,19 Semenyih Jaya Sdn Bhd v. Pentadbir Tanah Daerah 
Hulu Langat and another case,20 Indira Gandhi a/p Mutho v. Pengarah 
Jabatan Agama Islam Perak & Ors and other appeals21 and Alma Nudo 
Atenza v. PP & Another Appeal22 however have approved the basic 
structure doctrine in Malaysia. In Sivarasa Rasiah’s case, Gopal Sri 
Ram FCJ, delivering the unanimous decision of the Federal Court,23 
stated: “it is clear from the way in which the Federal Constitution is 
constructed there are certain features that constitute its basic fabric. 
Unless sanctioned by the Constitution itself, any statute (including one 
amending the Constitution) that offends the basic structure may be 
struck down as unconstitutional. Whether a particular feature is part of 
the basic structure must be worked out on a case by case basis. Suffice 
to say that the rights guaranteed by Part II which are enforceable in the 
courts form part of the basic structure of the Federal Constitution.”
19 [2010] 3 CLJ 507.
20 [2017] 5 CLJ 526.
21 [2018] 3 CLJ 145, FC.
22 [2019] 5 CLJ 780, FC.
23 The Federal Court comprising of  Richard Malanjum CJ (Sabah & Sarawak), 
Zulkefli Makinudin FCJ and Gopal Sri Ram FCJ.
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In Semenyih Jaya’s case, the Federal Court declared that s. 40D of 
the Land Acquisition Act 1960, which had removed the power of the 
judge to determine the value of the land and vested the same with 
two professional land valuers, as unconstitutional because it violated 
art. 121(1) of the Constitution. It was stated, inter alia, that ‘the power to 
award compensation in land reference proceedings is a judicial power 
that is vested in the High Court Judge sitting in the Land Reference 
Court.’ Delivering the unanimous decision of the Federal Court, Zainun 
Ali FCJ stated: ‘the Judiciary is thus entrusted with keeping every organ 
and institution of the state within its legal boundary. Concomitantly the 
concept of the independence of the Judiciary is the foundation of the 
principles of the separation of powers.’24 
The Semenyih Jaya’s case was followed in Indira Gandhi’s case, where 
a bench of five Federal Court judges25 unanimously nullified the 
unilateral conversion of three children to Islam by the father. The crux 
of the contentious issue in this case was whether the consent of only 
one parent is required to make minor children Muslim.26 Zainun Ali 
FCJ, once again delivering the judgment of the Federal Court, stated 
inter alia, that the vesting of judicial power of the Federation in the civil 
24 The Federal Court comprises of  Zulkefli Ahmad Makinudin CJ (Malaya), Hasan 
Lah FCJ, Zainun Ali FCJ, Abu Samah Nordin FCJ and Zaharah Ibrahim FCJ.
25 The Federal Court comprising of  Zulkefli Ahmad Makinudin PCA, Richard 
Malanjum CJ (Sabah and Sarawak), Zainun Ali FCJ, Abu Samah Nordin FCJ and 
Ramly Ali FCJ.
26 However, pursuant to s. 4 of  the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Amendment 
Act 2017 which came into effect on 15 December 2018, any application for divorce 
for marriage solemnised in a civil registry must be resolved in the civil court even if  
one of  the spouse has converted to Islam. The newly inserted sub-s. (1) of  s. 51 the 
Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 allow either party, or both parties, to 
a marriage to petition for a divorce where one of  them has converted to Islam. Prior 
to this amendment, only the non-converting spouse could petition for a divorce. 
Further, a new s. 51A to the Principal Act provides that where the converted 
spouse dies before the non-Muslim marriage is dissolved, the surviving spouse, the 
surviving children of  a marriage and the parents of  the deceased converted spouse 
will be entitled to participate in the distribution of  the matrimonial assets of  the 
deceased.
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courts formed part of the basic structure of the Constitution and could 
not be removed, even by constitutional amendment. In particular, her 
Ladyship stated:
‘It would be instructive to now distil the principles as have been 
illustrated above: (a) under art. 121(1) [Constitution], judicial power 
is vested exclusively in the civil High Courts. The jurisdiction and 
powers of the courts cannot be confined to federal law. The courts 
will continually and inevitably be engaged in the interpretation and 
enforcement of all laws that operate in this country and any other 
source of law recognised by our legal system; (b) judicial power in 
particular the power of judicial review, is an essential feature of the 
basic structure of the Constitution; (c) features in the basic structure 
of the Constitution cannot be abrogated by Parliament by way of 
constitutional amendment; (d) judicial power may not be removed 
from the High Courts; and (e) judicial power may not be conferred 
upon bodies other than the High Courts, unless such bodies comply 
with the safeguards provided in Part IX of the Constitution to ensure 
their independence.’ 
And more recently, in Alma Nudo Atenza v. PP & Another Appeal,27 
a nine-member bench led by Richard Malanjum CJ28 unequivocally 
approved the basic structure doctrine. In delivering the unanimous 
decision of the court, his Lordship stated: 
‘This court had, on several occasions, recognised that the principle of 
separation of powers and the power of the ordinary courts to review 
the legality of a State action, are sacrosanct and form part of the basic 
structure of the FC. Whether an enacted law is constitutionally valid 
is always for the courts to adjudicate and not for Parliament to decide.’ 
It was further stated that the courts can prevent Parliament from 
27 [2019] 5 CLJ 780, FC.
28 This case was heard by a panel of  nine Federal Court judges as follows: Richard 
Malanjum CJ, David Wong Dak Wah CJ (Sabah and Sarawak), Ramly Ali FCJ, Balia 
Yusof  Wahi FCJ, Alizatul Khair Osman FCJ, Rohana Yusuf  FCJ, Tengku Maimun 
Tuan Mat FCJ, Abang Iskandar FCJ and Nallini Pathmanathan FCJ.
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destroying the ‘basic structure’ of the Federal Constitution. ‘And while 
the FC does not specifically explicate the doctrine of basic structure, 
what the doctrine signifies is that a parliamentary enactment is open to 
scrutiny not only for clear-cut violation of the FC but also for violation 
of the doctrines or principles that constitute the constitutional 
foundation. The role of the Judiciary is intrinsic to this constitutional 
order. Whether an enacted law is constitutionally valid is always for the 
courts to adjudicate and not for Parliament to decide.’
From the above, it is thus apparent that the doctrine of basic structure 
has now form part of the law of Malaysia and with it the judiciary is 
empowered to nullify any legislation including any amendment to the 
Constitution when it conflicts with or seeks to alter the basic structure 
of the Constitution. In light of the acceptance of the basic structure 
doctrine in Malaysia, Mohd Hishamudin Yunus, the former Court 
of Appeal judge, stated: ‘only by restoring judicial powers can the 
judiciary act as an effective check and balance on Parliament and on 
the executive, and the independence of the judiciary restored. With the 
basic structure doctrine, our constitutional framework and its essential 
features may be maintained and the three branches of Government, 
i.e. the Executive, the Judiciary and Parliament, kept within their 
constitutional limits.’29 
29 See Mohd Hishamudin Yunus, ‘The Malaysian Constitution and the Basic Structure 
Doctrine’ in Legal Herald November 2018 at https://www.lh-ag.com/wp-content/
uploads/2018/12/1-The-Malaysian-Constitution-and-the-Basic-Structure-
Doctrine.pdf
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23.3 APPLICATION OF BASIC STRUCTURE DOCTRINE: 
WITH REFERENCE TO DECIDED CASES
The application of the basic structure doctrine may be further illustrated 
with reference to the decided cases shown in the table below. 
Bank Kerjasama Rakyat 
Malaysia Bhd v. Koperasi 
Amanah Pelaburan Bhd30
It was held, inter alia, that s. 82(1)(d), (3)(c), (5) and 
(7) of the Co-operative Societies Act 1948 which has 
the effect that the civil court can only have jurisdiction 
to hear the action when the Malaysia Co-operative 
Societies Commission requires the plaintiff and 
defendant to refer the case to the court, had altered the 
basic structure of the Constitution regarding the court’s 
exclusive judicial power to decide disputes under 
art. 121(1) of the Federal Constitution and thus, 
by virtue of art. 4(1) of the Constitution the above 
provisions were void to the extent of the encroachment. 
Peguam Negara Malaysia v. 
Chin Chee Kow & Another 
Appeal31
The Federal Court was faced with the issue whether 
the power of the Attorney General under s. 9(1) of 
the Government Proceedings Act 1956 to grant or 
refuse consent was amenable to judicial review. Mohd 
Zawawi Salleh FCJ delivering the judgment of the court 
reiterated the important pronouncement in Semenyih 
Jaya’s case namely, “that the power of judicial review 
‘cannot be changed or altered by Parliament by way 
of a constitutional amendment.’ The court further 
stated, ‘the power of judicial review is essential to the 
constitutional role of the courts, and inherent in basic 
structure of the constitution’. The Federal Court’s 
reassertion of constitutional judicial power and its 
status as superior court meant that the power of the AG 
to grant or refuse consent under s. 9(1) of Act 359 is 
amenable to judicial review.”
30 [2019] 1 LNS 1099. 
31 [2019] 4 CLJ 561, FC.
Application Of  Basic Structure 
Doctrine: With Reference To Decided Cases
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Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim 
v. Kerajaan Malaysia & 
Anor32
The appellant sought to challenge the constitutionality 
of the National Security Council Act 2016 (NSCA) 
which became law by virtue of  art. 66(4A) of the 
Federal Constitution. The appellant contended 
that art. 66(4A) which provides that a Bill which 
is not assented to by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong 
within the time specified under art. 66(4) i.e., 
30 days, shall become law as if it had been assented to, 
is unconstitutional because the amendment offended 
the basic structure of the Constitution. Accordingly, 
the NSCA which was enacted in accordance with 
art. 149, which became law pursuant to art. 66(4A), 
was unconstitutional, null and void. In dismissing the 
above application, Rohana Yusuf JCA delivering the 
judgment of the court stated: ‘All these can only mean 
that the challenge posed by the appellant is questioning 
the power of the Parliament to legislate the impugned 
laws which fall squarely under art. 4 read with art. 128 
and is therefore within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
Federal Court.’
Mohamad Raimi Ab Rahim 
& Ors v. Dato’ Seri Mohd 
Najib Tun Haji Abdul 
Razak & Ors33
The applicant submitted that the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership Agreement (TPPA), if signed by the 
respondents, will be ultra vires the Constitution, and 
damaging the basic structure of the Constitution. 
In dismissing the above application, it was held inter 
alia, that the signing of the TPPA involves a policy 
consideration by the Federal Government and is not 
for the Court to question the merits or demerits of the 
Government decision to sign the TPPA.
Teh Swee Chin & Ors v. PP34 The applicants contended that the Parliament has no 
power to make laws which are inconsistent with the 
Federal Constitution or introduce any law such as 
the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act 2012 
(SOSMA) which undermine the doctrine of separation 
of powers and independence of the judiciary which 
formed part of the basic structure of the Federal 
Constitution. In rejecting the above contention, 
32 [2019] 1 CLJ 445, CA.
33 [2016] 1 LNS 575.
34 [2018] 1 LNS 891.
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Ahmad Shahrir Mohd Salleh JC, stated: ‘Parliament 
has deemed it necessary to pass the Security Offences 
(Special Measures) (Amendment) Act 2014 to include 
the offence of being a member of an organized 
criminal group under s. 130V(1) of the Penal Code as a 
security offence under the First Schedule of SOSMA ... 
[T]he offence under s. 130V(1) of the Penal Code falls 
squarely within the categories of actions envisaged by 
art. 149(1)(a) of the Federal Constitution. Its addition 
to the First Schedule of SOSMA by Security Offences 
(Special Measures) (Amendment) Act 2014 is entirely 
defensible in the circumstances and I do not find it 
being ultra vires, either of art. 5(1) or art. 8(1).’
Christin Nirmal v. PP35 The appellant was charged and convicted for trafficking 
in dangerous drugs, an offence under s. 39B(1)(a) 
of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 (‘DDA’) and was 
sentenced to mandatory death pursuant to s. 39B(2) of 
the DDA. Subsequently, the appellant challenged the 
validity of s. 39B(1)(a) of the DDA contending inter 
alia, that the mandatory death penalty for trafficking 
in dangerous drug was inconsistent with art. 5(1) of 
the Federal Constitution. In delivering the judgment 
of the court, Yeoh Wee Siam JCA stated: ‘We are of 
the firm opinion that the function of the courts is to 
interpret the law, and not to declare the mandatory 
death penalty under the impugned provisions of the 
DDA as unconstitutional. It is the Legislature, being 
the policy-maker, which has to amend the DDA and 
abolish the mandatory death sentence if it thinks that it 
is cruel and harsh, and a draconian law which is not in 
keeping with international trends, and “is inconsistent 
with the Federal Constitution for being arbitrary and 
disproportionate and for failing to take into account 
individual mitigating circumstances”.’
35 [2019] 2 CLJ 471, CA. 
Application Of  Basic Structure 
Doctrine: With Reference To Decided Cases
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JRI Resources Sdn Bhd v. 
Kuwait Finance House 
(Malaysia) Bhd; President 
of Association of Islamic 
Banking Institutions 
Malaysia & Anor 
(Interveners)36
The Federal Court had considered the constitutionality 
of ss. 56 and 57 of the Central Bank of Malaysia Act 
2009 (CBMA).37 The majority decision38 held that the 
vesting of power with the Shariah Advisory Council 
(SAC) in Shariah matter arising in the Islamic financing 
facility did not breach the Federal Constitution because 
SAC’s ruling does not in any way usurp the judicial 
power of the civil courts. It was stated that SAC merely 
ascertains the Islamic financing issues while the final 
determination of the dispute between parties is still 
within the jurisdiction of the civil courts. The reasoning 
of the court is summarised below.
(i) that s. 57 of the CBMA does not conclude or 
settle the Islamic financing dispute between 
the parties as the determination of a borrower’s 
liability is decided by the presiding judge. 
‘Hence, an ‘ascertainment’ exercise which 
results in a ‘ruling’ must not be confused with 
an act of ‘determination’ which results in a 
final decision.’
36 [2019] 5 CLJ 569, FC. This case was heard by a a panel of  nine- Federal Court 
judges as follows; Richard Malanjum CJ, Ahmad Maarop PCA, Zaharah Ibrahim 
CJ (Malaya), David Wong Dak Wah CJ (Sabah and Sarawak), Ramly Ali FCJ, Azahar 
Mohamed FCJ, Alizatul Khair Osman FCJ, Mohd Zawawi Salleh FCJ, Idrus Harun 
FCJ.
37 Section 56(1) provides ‘Where in any proceedings relating to Islamic financial 
business before any court or arbitrator any question arises concerning a Shariah 
matter, the court or the arbitrator, as the case may be, shall – (a) take into 
consideration any published rulings of  the Shariah Advisory Council; or (b) refer 
such question to the Shariah Advisory Council for its ruling. (2) Any request for 
advice or a ruling of  the Shariah Advisory Council under this Act or any other law 
shall be submitted to the secretariat.’ Further, s. 57 provides ‘Any ruling made by 
the Shariah Advisory Council pursuant to a reference made under this Part shall be 
binding on the Islamic financial institutions under s. 55 and the court or arbitrator 
making a reference under s. 56.’
38 The majority decision was delivered by Mohd Zawawi Salleh FCJ with Ahmad 
Maarop PCA, Ramly Ali, Azahar Mohamed, Alizatul Khair Osman FCJJ concurring.
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(ii) that SAC’s ruling was solely confined to the 
Shariah issues and it is the presiding judge 
who made reference to the SAC would exercise 
his judicial power and decide the case based 
on the evidence submitted before the court. 
Hence, ‘the SAC did not usurp the judicial 
power of the court.’
(iii) that s. 56(1) gives option to the court or 
arbitrator whether to take into consideration 
the published ruling of the SAC or refer the 
Shariah issue to the SAC for ruling. ‘The word 
‘or’ in s. 56(1) signifies that such option is 
provided to the court or arbitrator and the 
phrase ‘take into consideration’ implies that 
only the court or arbitrator has the exclusive 
judicial power to decide on the case by 
applying the ruling of the SAC to the facts of 
the case before them.
(iv) that the binding nature of the SAC’s ruling is 
justified as the civil courts are not sufficiently 
equipped to make findings on Islamic financial 
matters unlike the SAC which comprises of 
scholars experts on Islamic finance and hence, 
the SAC ruling ‘conserves and protects the 
public interest.’ 
(v) that the use of expert evidence on Islamic 
financial matters would not be helpful to a civil 
court judge as, ultimately, the judge would 
have to decide which expert opinion to rely 
on and this could be further complicated if 
each expert based his/her opinion on different 
schools of Islamic jurisprudence.
However, David Wong Dak Wah CJ (Sabah & Sarawak) 
and Richard Malanjum CJ penned the dissenting 
judgment in Kuwait Finance House. In his judgment, 
David Wong Dak Wah CJ (Sabah & Sarawak) stated 
that the ‘SAC had by its role of providing a binding 
ruling on the courts, had in no uncertain terms stepped 
into the sphere of judicial function which under the FC 
Application Of  Basic Structure 
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is solely reserved to the civil courts.’ Sections 56 and 
57 which had clothed SAC, a non-judicial body under 
the FC, with judicial power have in fact violated the 
doctrine of separation of powers.
Likewise, Richard Malanjum CJ in his separate 
dissenting judgment stated that the following 
functions of the SAC fell clearly within the core area 
of judicial power namely, that SAC exercised an 
adjudicative function; finally resolved the dispute on 
the issue of Shariah law; and gave a decision which 
was immediately enforceable and binding on the High 
Court. His Lordship stated: ‘In the circumstances, s. 57 
of the CBMA contravenes art. 121 of the FC in so far as 
it provides that any ruling made by the SAC pursuant 
to a reference is binding on the High Court making the 
reference. The effect of the section is to vest judicial 
power in the SAC to the exclusion of the High Court 
on Shariah matters. The section must be struck down 
as unconstitutional and void.’
23.4 CRITICISM AGAINST BASIC STRUCTURE DOCTRINE
Despite the approval of the basic structure principle in Malaysia, Tun 
Abdul Hamid Mohamad, the former Chief Justice of Malaysia, had 
vehemently opposed the adoption of this doctrine. According to him, 
the Constitution has vested power with the Parliament to amend any 
part of the Constitution in any way they think fit, provided that all the 
conditions precedent prescribed by the Constitution itself are followed. 
The above is in fact fortifying the views of Suffian LP in Phang Chin 
Hock v. Public Prosecutor,39 where his Lordship stated: ‘If it is correct 
that amendments made to the Constitution are valid only if consistent 
with its existing provisions, then clearly no change whatsoever may be 
made to the Constitution; in other words, art. 159 is superfluous, for 
the Constitution cannot be changed or altered in any way, as if it has 
been carved in granite. If our Constitution makers had intended that 
39 [1979] 1 LNS 67, FC. 
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their successors should not in any way alter their handiwork, it would 
have been perfectly easy for them to so provide; but nowhere in the 
Constitution does it appear that that was their intention, even if they 
had been so unrealistic as to harbour such intention. On the contrary 
apart from art. 159, there are many provisions showing that they 
realized that the Constitution should be a living document intended 
to be workable between the partners that constitute the Malayan (later 
Malaysian) policy, a living document that is reviewable from time to 
time in the light of experience and, if need be, amended.’
It is noteworthy that since its adoption in 1957, the Federal Constitution 
had been amended more than 57 times40 and the recent one being the 
Constitution (Amendment) Bill 2019 which is aimed at amending 
arts. 47 and 119 of the Constitution so as to lower the voting age from 
21 to 18.41 Basically, there are four methods of Constitution amendment 
as highlighted by Raja Azlan Shah, FJ (as his late Highness then was) in 
Loh Kooi Choon v. Government of Malaysia42 namely: ‘(1) Some parts of 
the Constitution can be amended by a simple majority in both Houses 
of Parliament such as that required for the passing of any ordinary law. 
They are enumerated in cl. (4) of art. 159 and are specifically excluded 
from the purview of art. 159; (2) The amending cl. (5) of art. 159 which 
requires a two-thirds majority in both Houses of Parliament and 
40 See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_amendments_to_the_Constitution_
of_Malaysia. Recently, there was an attempt to amend art. 1(2) of  the Federal 
Constitution making Sabah and Sarawak equal partners with peninsular Malaysia 
in the Federation of  Malaysia. Unfortunately, the Government failed to obtain 
the two-third Parliament majority needed to amend: see ‘Govt fails to get two-
thirds Parliament majority to amend Constitution at https://www.thestar.com.
my/news/nation/2019/04/09/constitutional-amendment-fails-in-dewan-
rakyat#e2xhOgKyayeqzfYR.99
41 See ‘Dewan Rakyat passes Bill to amend Federal Constitution to lower voting age to 18’ 
at https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2019/07/16/federal-constitution- 
amended-to-lower-voting-age-to-18#KixgQxxKoKt1pu0I.99
42 [1975] 1 LNS 90.
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the consent of the Conference of Rulers; (3) The amending cl. (2) of 
art. 161E which is of special interest to East Malaysia and which requires 
a two-thirds majority in both Houses of Parliament and the consent of 
the Governor of the East Malaysian State in question; (4) The amending 
cl. (3) of art. 159 which requires a majority of two-thirds in both Houses 
of Parliament.’ The procedure to amend the Constitution as contained 
in art. 159 is reproduced below. 
(1) Subject to the following provisions of this Article and to Article 
161E, the provisions of this Constitution may be amended by 
federal law. 
(2) (Repealed). 
(3) A Bill for making any amendment to the Constitution (other than 
an amendment excepted from the provisions of this Clause) and 
a Bill for making any amendment to a law passed under Clause 
(4) of Article 10 shall not be passed in either House of Parliament 
unless it has been supported on Second and third Readings by the 
votes of not less than two-thirds of the total number of members 
of that House.
(4) The following amendments are excepted from the provisions of 
Clause (3), that is to say: 
(a) any amendment to Part III of the Second or to the Sixth or 
Seventh Schedule;
(b) any amendment incidental to or consequential on the 
exercise of any power to make law conferred on Parliament 
by any provision of this Constitution other than Articles 74 
and 76;
(bb) subject to Article 161E any amendment made for or in 
connection with the admission of any State to the Federation 
or its association with the States thereof, or any modification 
made as to the application of this Constitution to a State 
previously so admitted or associated;
(c) any amendment consequential on an amendment made 
under paragraph (a).
 
FOR ACADEMIC 
REPOSITORY 
PURPOSES 
ONLY
729
(5) A law making an amendment to Clause (4) of Article 10, any law 
passed thereunder, the provisions of Part III, Article 38, Clause 
(4) of Article 63, Article 70, Clause (1) of Article 71, Clause (4) of 
Article 72, Article 152, or 153 or to this Clause shall not be passed 
without the consent of the Conference of Rulers. 
(6) In this Article “amendment” includes addition and repeal; and in 
this Article and in paragraph (a) of Article 2 “State” includes any 
territory.
Apart from the above, Tun Abdul Hamid Mohamad also contended 
that with the adoption of the basic structure doctrine, the ‘judges are 
giving themselves the power to amend or rewrite the Constitution.’ In 
his article entitled ‘No Judge is a Parliament’, he stated: 
“I must emphasise that I am objecting to the introduction of the basic 
structure principle invented by the Indian Judges on ground of principle 
and nothing else. We cherish the doctrines of independence of the 
judiciary, separation of powers, rule of law, Parliamentary democracy 
and supremacy of the Constitution. Now Judges are giving themselves 
the power to amend or rewrite the Constitution. I stand by what I had 
said in my judgments: No Judge is a Parliament. If the doctrine of 
separation of powers were to have any meaning, all the three branches 
of the Government i.e. Legislature, Executive and Judiciary must 
respect each other’s jurisdiction. I hope our members of Parliament are 
aware of what is happening. What recourse do they have? The answer 
is to revert to the Constitution. The power to amend the Constitution 
is vested in the Parliament. In the name of parliamentary democracy 
and separation of powers, all members of Parliament, whether they are 
from the Government or the opposition, should come together and 
move a bill to amend the Constitution to the effect that Parliament may 
amend any part of the Constitution provided that the procedure laid 
down by the Constitution is followed. The original position should be 
restored.”43 
43 Tun Abdul Hamid Mohamad, ‘No Judge is a Parliament’ delivered at the 
International Islamic University Malaysia symposium entitled “Constitutional 
Oath, Rule of  Law and Supreme Policing Role of  the Judiciary” on 30 March 2018: 
see https://tunabdulhamid.me/2018/03/no-judge-is-a-parliament/
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23.5 CONCLUSION
The doctrine of basic structure provides that the Constitution has 
certain basic features that cannot be altered or destroyed through 
legislative amendment and the judiciary is empowered to strike down 
an amendment to the constitution or any other enacted laws which 
conflict with or seek to alter this basic structure doctrine. Initially, this 
doctrine was disapproved in Malaysia in Loh Kooi Choon, Phang Chin 
Hock and Kok Wah Kuan. However, in Sivarasa Rasiah, Semenyih Jaya, 
Indira Gandhi and Alma Nudo Atenza this doctrine has been accepted 
and it now form part of the law of Malaysia. It is noteworthy that by 
virtue of the conflicting apex court’s decisions as above, the doctrine of 
stare decisis dictates that the legal principle embodied in the recent apex 
court’s decision has to be followed by subsequent cases.44 Hence, any 
constitutionality or legality of the executive action is questionable in the 
High Court by way of judicial review.45 The judiciary is also empowered 
to review the legislation and any constitutional amendments which 
violates the basic structure of the constitution. For example, the 
constitutionality of ss. 56 and 57 of the Central Bank of Malaysia Act 
2009 which in effect vested the ‘judicial power’ in the Shariah Advisory 
Council on matters relating to Islamic finance business was recently 
decided by the Federal Court in JRI Resources Sdn Bhd v. Kuwait Finance 
House (Malaysia) Bhd; President of Association of Islamic Banking 
Institutions Malaysia & Anor (Interveners).46 Further, art. 128(1)(a) of 
the Federal Constitution empowers the Federal Court to decide on the 
validity of a law enacted by Parliament or by the Legislature of a State.47 
In short, the judiciary is empowered to ‘prevent Parliament from 
destroying the “basic structure” of the Federal Constitution’.48 
44 See Dalip Bhagwan Singh v. PP [1997] 4 CLJ 645, FC.
45 Ann Joo Steel Bhd v. Pengarah Tanah Dan Galian Negeri Pulau Pinang & Anor And 
Another Appeal [2019] 9 CLJ 153, FC.
46 See JRI Resources Sdn Bhd v. Kuwait Finance House (Malaysia) Bhd; President of  Association 
of  Islamic Banking Institutions Malaysia & Anor (Interveners) [2019] 5 CLJ 569, FC.
47 Article 128 (1)(a) of  the Federal Constitution provides ‘the Federal Court shall, to the 
exclusion of  any other court, have jurisdiction to determine in accordance with any 
rules of  court regulating the exercise of  such jurisdiction—(a) any question whether 
a law made by parliament or by the Legislature of  a State is invalid on the ground that 
it makes provision with respect to a matter with respect to which parliament or, as the 
case may be, the Legislature of  the State has no power to make laws’.
48 Per Richard Malanjum CJ Alma Nudo Atenza v PP & Another Appeal [2019] 5 CLJ 
780, FC. 
